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## IN THE COMPETITION APPEAL TRIBUNAL

Salisbury Square House 8 Salisbury Square London EC4Y 8AP

Monday 29<sup>th</sup> January – Friday 22<sup>nd</sup> March 2024

Case No: 1381/7/7/21

Before:

The Honourable Mr Justice Waksman

Eamonn Doran

Derek Ridyard

(Sitting as a Tribunal in England and Wales)

**BETWEEN**:

Justin Le Patourel Class Representative

 $\mathbf{v}$ 

(1) BT Group PLC Respondent

(2) British Telecommunications PLC

## APPEARANCES

Ronit Kreisberger KC, Derek Spitz, Michael Armitage, Jack Williams and Matthew Barry (On behalf of Justin Le Patourel)

Daniel Beard KC, Sarah Love, Daisy Mackersie, Natalie Nguyen and Ali Al-Karim (On behalf of BT Group PLC and British Telecommunications PLC)

Jennifer MacLeod (On behalf of the Competition & Markets Authority)

1	Monday, 4 March 2024
2	(10.30 am)
3	THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning. Some of you are joining us
4	live stream on our website, so I must start with the
5	customary warning: an official recording is being made
6	and an authorised transcript will be produced, but it is
7	strictly prohibited for anyone else to make an
8	unauthorised recording, whether audio or visual, of the
9	proceedings, and breach of that provision is punishable
L 0	as contempt of court.
11	Now, you will see that Mr Ridyard is not present in
L2	court. He is with us remotely. There have been
L3	transportation difficulties today. But nonetheless,
L 4	Mr Ridyard is going to be leading the questions on
L5	quantum, so I will now hand over to him.
L 6	MR BEARD: I am really sorry, can we just get them both
L7	reaffirmed.
L8	THE CHAIRMAN: It is becoming a very bad habit. I apologise
L9	for that. Yes.
20	DR HELEN JENKINS (reaffirmed)
21	MR DAVID PARKER (reaffirmed)
22	Questions by THE TRIBUNAL
23	THE CHAIRMAN: Right. I shall now hand over to Mr Ridyard.
24	MR RIDYARD: Good morning, everyone.
>5	So our first questions today are about the agreement

1	on the Class size, and we have seen the letters that
2	came in this morning or over the weekend, so it seems
3	that we basically have agreement, as we understand it,
4	on the Class size after the Commitments, but there is
5	still some difference between you as to how to allocate
6	people between VOCs and SPCs beforehand.
7	Dr Jenkins, is that a correct summary?
8	DR JENKINS: Yes, that is my understanding.
9	MR PARKER: I think the position has changed. I am happy to
10	agree to Dr Jenkins' split pre-Commitments. I think the
11	only remaining sort of issues are about gifted accounts
12	and business customers. But subject to those, I think
13	we are in the same place on the size of the Class.
14	MR RIDYARD: All right. Okay. Is there anything to say
15	about the gifted business?
16	MR PARKER: You have some questions later on, but I do not
17	think those should be excluded.
18	THE CHAIRMAN: Just to be clear, there has not been any
19	dispute about the overall size of the Class before you
20	do the sub-classes in any event, so the split is
21	actually it is a numerical split now?
22	MR PARKER: Yes, so we are all in agreement after the
23	Commitments. We had we were in agreement about the
24	total pre-Commitments. There was some debate about how
25	you split between Voice Only and Split Purchase

1	Customers, and there was a very minor issue about test
2	accounts
3	THE CHAIRMAN: So this is not just a percentage split; the
4	figures are agreed, the underlying figures are agreed?
5	MR PARKER: The underlying figures are agreed, yes.
6	THE CHAIRMAN: Good, thank you.
7	MR RIDYARD: Let us move on to the question of actually
8	quantifying the overcharge. First of all, do we have
9	agreement on the actual prices charged by BT throughout
10	the claim period?
11	Mr Parker.
12	MR PARKER: I believe we do. The latest version of the
13	ARPUs is I think in no need to turn it up, but it is
14	in Parker 5. For your note, it is at $\{E/5/192\}$ , Table
15	19. Those are the latest versions which, as
16	I understand it, are I am not aware of a dispute.
17	DR JENKINS: So I think there were two differences prior
18	at the joint expert stage. One was about the treatment
19	of BT employees, and I agree with, I think it was
20	Mr Duckworth, who set out that when we strip out
21	employee lines, we should strip out revenue from ARPU,
22	so I agree to that.
23	There was also the question of Line Rental Saver.
24	I think there is some dispute about the value of that,
25	but I think the final agreed figures include LRS, but

1	that is my only query about whether we are on the
2	same whether we take the same position.
3	But it is a small difference and I think they are
4	more or less agreed, so we can
5	MR RIDYARD: Fine. Thank you very much.
6	So then we get to obviously the more contentious
7	area, which is what we should be comparing the actual
8	prices against.
9	Maybe Mr Parker, you might want to go first on this.
10	I mean, as I understand it, you are proposing that we
11	compare the actual prices with the cost-plus benchmark.
12	Is that your position?
13	MR PARKER: Yes, those are the two prices or measures that
14	we have. We have a cost-plus benchmark, we have the
15	actual prices. I have compared the two and taken the
16	difference for the purposes of quantum.
17	MR RIDYARD: So your position then is that the cost-plus
18	benchmark is, if you like, the non-infringing price, or,
19	rather, the workable competition benchmark, I should
20	say, and it is simply a matter of comparing the actual
21	prices against that notion of workable competition in
22	your under your analysis.
23	MR PARKER: That is the way I have looked at it. As you
24	sort of trail there, there is potentially a difference
25	between the non-infringing price and the price under

1	workable competition, and that is because of the
2	significant and persistent test under limb 1, so there
3	there is some gap there.

But for the purposes of quantum, having reached the conclusion that we are above the significant and persistent level, obviously all these points are matters for the Tribunal, I have taken the view then that the prices -- we do not have what the non-infringing price is, so I have taken the workable competition price and the ARPU and taken the difference.

MR RIDYARD: So then just to be clear on that possible distinction between non-infringing and workable competition, you are saying that the difference arises because of the significance and persistence elements of that test, but you are effectively not proposing to give BT any credit for that difference in the way in which you approach the damage calculation?

MR PARKER: I am not clear what appropriate difference one would give. Clearly it would be easy to adjust the calculations if necessary. But, no, I am not at the moment giving BT any credit for that -- for a non-infringing price that is above the level of workable competition. I am not actually sure what that is, if you like.

MR RIDYARD: Okay, that seems to imply that either you think

there is a difference between workable competition and non-infringing price, or you do not, so I am not sure what you are saying about that.

MR PARKER: Well, for the purposes of liability I am saying there is a difference between workable competition and non-infringing price, and that gap is the significant and persistent test. So you could price above the workably competitive level on a persistent basis, but not significantly above, and that would mean that you were above the workably competitive level but not so much as to infringe Chapter II. So from a liability perspective, there is that gap.

From a quantum perspective, there is then a question of: do you say, well, we should calculate whatever the non-infringing price is and give BT that credit, if you like, and it can only have resulted in damage above whatever the non-infringing price is, and so on? The problem is, we do not know what the non-infringing price is, because that is ultimately going to be a legal question as to how large the significant metric is in significant and persistent. Therefore I have looked at the two numbers we do know, which is the workably competitive benchmark and the price.

MR RIDYARD: Okay.

2.2

Dr Jenkins, what is your perspective on this?

DR JENKINS: 1es, so in a sense, I do not necessarily agree
that there is that the way the question is worded,
which is "the" cost-plus benchmark and "the" actual
price. I think "the" actual price, we can agree there
is one price, but the way in which the cost-plus
benchmark itself may be defined differs. So we also
know, even in the structure of the United Brands test,
there can be a difference between the cost-plus
benchmark and the fair price, right, so that is allowed,
that there is the limb 2 characterisation can mean
there is a difference with what is a fair price, and, in
my view, the loss should be calculated from the price
that would hypothetically have been charged under
workable competition, which is the fair price, rather
than the cost-plus benchmark.

So that fair price takes account of all the limb 1 and the limb 2 factors, that that is what is being sought to be identified, what is the fair price under workable competition, and the *United Brands* test gives a guide of what are the conditions that you would take into account. In a sense, it starts with limb 1, because it says: okay, if you identify a price under limb 1, such that the observed price is below or equal to that benchmark, then it is fair, because it is reflecting the costs to the producer. So that is like

one test of fairness. Then you have the limb 2 considerations, which then say there could be other reasons why prices are above any identified cost-plus benchmark.

So I think, as a matter of economics and logic, you would take that the right benchmark is the fair price, once you have determined what is fair.

Then if we think about what does that mean in this case? My opinion is that there are a range of fair prices that could be observed, and that is actually driven both from how one thinks about the cost-plus benchmark in this case, as well as other considerations relating to economic value and comparators, so that there is not -- one cannot identify the unique cost benchmark that would -- that one could certainly say would be observed under workable competition.

I think the cost-plus benchmark that Mr Duckworth has put forward he has described, himself, as a cost of production, and that in itself is unlikely therefore to be a good measure of what would actually be observed in workable competition in this case. It does not reflect the range of ways that common costs could be allocated, and in a situation even where common costs are not well understood, it does not reflect the different ways that indirect costs could be allocated under workable

1	competition.

2.2

Then in terms of the rate of return chosen, it does not reflect the dispersion that you might see in workably competitive conditions to reflect such aspects as brand, efficiency, aspects of horizontal differentiation, risk, reward, uncertainties. All of those sorts of things are things you would see in a workably competitive environment.

THE CHAIRMAN: Could I just follow up on that. The context for dealing with these quantum questions is hypothetically that it has been found that the price charged was unfair per *United Brands*, so that debate has been and gone. So this is purely about what should be the foundation for the quantum exercise and the damages and the difference between two figures which is then going to be multiplied.

Are you saying that this should be calculated -- is your counterfactual, therefore, you say, well, what would they have done had it not been unfair? Well, they would have charged a fair price, and the fair price could be above the competitive benchmark which the Tribunal has already found. Because obviously the Tribunal will have found a benchmark, and it will already have found, on this hypothesis, that it is excessive, that significant ...

1	So the thing that should be deducted from the price
2	charged, or the ARPU, is the fair price which may be
3	above the competitive benchmark?
4	DR JENKINS: That is right, depending how the competitive
5	benchmark itself has been arrived at. If the benchmark
6	itself already captures all the limb 1 and limb 2
7	factors, then you may not have anything additional. But
8	in the event that you have a cost-plus benchmark that
9	does not take into account questions of economic value
10	or significance and persistence, then the price that
11	should be used is the fair price, which is the one that
12	does take into account all the considerations.
13	THE CHAIRMAN: Right. I understand why you have not done
14	this, but am I right in thinking it is not as if you
15	have proffered some particular fair price?
16	DR JENKINS: I have. I have proffered a fair price.
17	THE CHAIRMAN: I am sorry, I have missed it in that case.
18	DR JENKINS: No, that is fine. In the sense that the price
19	that I calculate under the SAC combinatorial approach,
20	which is a cost-plus benchmark, but it is one which
21	I think is the fair price, and therefore one can use
22	that as the benchmark to use as quantum. That is
23	implicitly or explicitly what I have done in my
24	reports. The reason being that that approach allows for
25	the flexibility for a firm in a workably competitive

1	environment to recover its costs in response to the
2	market conditions, and it also used a rate of return
3	which recognises both recognises the dispersion by
4	taking the upper end of the distribution of returns. It
5	is capturing some elements of economic value, brand,
6	efficiency, all of those elements.
7	THE CHAIRMAN: I see. So if you were looking at your model,
8	and for some reason it is still excessive, perhaps
9	because some of your variables have changed or something
10	like that, that is your conception of a fair price?
11	DR JENKINS: That is right.
12	THE CHAIRMAN: There would be nothing to add on to it, to
13	take away from the actual value?
14	DR JENKINS: Yes.
15	THE CHAIRMAN: Ah.
16	DR JENKINS: Given there is uncertainty generally, the
17	Tribunal might say, "oh, we are going to add some small
18	buffer at that point", you know. But as a matter of
19	economic principle, I think once you have taken the
20	limb 1 and limb 2 considerations into account, and you
21	have thought, okay, here is the range of reasonable
22	prices that one might observe in workable competition,
23	and here is sort of a fair price in that context, then
24	you would not expect you would quantify the
25	difference between that fair price and the actual price.

1	THE CHAIRMAN: Right. So the real work that your conception	
2	of fair price is doing on quantum would be, for example,	
3	if, hypothetically, we were to use a Duckworth-derived	
4	benchmark which yielded an excessive price and an	
5	unfair and then we looked at it and it was unfair,	
6	you would say: there could still be a fair price above	
7	his competitive benchmark which relates to factors, and	
8	the question is depending on whether we have taken all	
9	those factors into account already or not; is that	
10	a fair summary?	
11	DR JENKINS: That is a fair summary with so if one goes	
12	for a cost of production-type measure of the cost-plus	
13	benchmark, then there is a range of considerations that	
14	one would take into account, and whether the Tribunal	
15	takes them into account at the significant and	
16	persistent, or the limb 2 economic value comparator	
17	test, you have these other indicators of the general	
18	market context, what rivals were doing, the variation	
19	that you observe in pricing, both in this market and	
20	others, which reflect that taking if you take	
21	a benchmark that is the cost-plus benchmark and it is	
22	below the fair price, or below a likely fair price, then	
23	it seems to me that is problematic for the quantum. It	
24	does not reflect loss under article	

25 THE CHAIRMAN: I am sorry to persist with this but I just

1	want to be absolutely So what you are not saying,
2	for example, is let us take something purely
3	hypothetical the competitive benchmark is 50 and
4	the price charged is 100, and therefore prima facie the
5	overcharge would be 50. I take your point about other
6	factors that you say might still have to be built in,
7	but what you are not saying, for example, is, well, even
8	if 50 is significantly, etc, above the benchmark,
9	suppose somebody charged 60, that would not be
10	excessive. So therefore you would take 100 from 60
11	60 from 100. You are not doing it that way round, it is
12	all about these additional factors?
13	DR JENKINS: Yes, so. If you had a cost benchmark that was
14	at 50, and you observed reasonable workably competitive
15	comparators were charging 60, then at limb 2 you might
16	factor that in as part of your comparator analysis and
17	say, well, 60 looks like a fair price, and so I am going
18	to take 60 as my fair benchmark despite the fact that my
19	cost benchmark is 50.
20	THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, and that is all in the limb 2 analysis.
21	DR JENKINS: But if what was said is at 50 you have
22	incorporated all the factors, including all the limb 2,
23	then, yes.
24	THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

MR RIDYARD: So is any of this adding anything that we have

1	not already fully discussed in the limb 1 and limb 2
2	discussions, Dr Jenkins? Is there anything additional
3	here that has not already been discussed two weeks ago?
4	DR JENKINS: We may not have we may not have thought or
5	talked very much about the calls element of the quantum,
6	which currently is quantified as every penny above
7	Mr Duckworth's cost of production of calls, and I do not
8	think much attention has been paid to I mean,
9	a little bit, we talked a little bit about the limb 2
10	considerations, if that is the right way to put it, for
11	the calls element, but that there is a lot of
12	evidence that the market context is one where you
13	observe higher margins on calls quite and that BT's
14	pricing is around the same level if not below its
15	rivals' prices, that when Ofcom introduced the
16	Commitments, it did not make any adjustment to the calls
17	prices itself, and that the Class Members had not made
18	use of, and in increasing frequency, alternative means
19	of making calls through this period.
20	So I think that is more about how one determines
21	what the fair price would be for that calls element,
22	but
23	MR RIDYARD: I am not clear why that would be an additional
24	consideration here, because we looked at total revenues
25	of the business and compared it to the costs, so

1	anything that surely is already included, the
2	assessment of calls, is it not?
3	DR JENKINS: It does. All I am saying is when we are
4	thinking about how you move from a cost-plus benchmark
5	which is determined under conditions which are a cost of
6	production approach, and then you move to thinking about
7	what would be the fair price, which is what we are
8	talking about here, your question was: is there anything
9	more that we have not covered? So I think one would
10	want to think about both access and calls as well as SFV
11	services together since the claim, as it stands, has
12	a significant element on the access element and on the
13	calls element.
14	MR RIDYARD: Mr Parker, any comments on that?
15	MR PARKER: I think only a couple. One is a lot of that
16	I think is already included in the limb 1 analysis in
17	particular. I think the point about an adjustment for
18	fairness as opposed to the cost-plus benchmark, I can
19	see that.
20	Now, my view, as we discussed last week, is I do not
21	think there is anything that would lead to an adjustment
22	for fairness. But I can see that potentially, if you
23	like, if you thought there was economic value, that it

did not -- it was not sufficient to overcome the

significant and persistent test, and if you were able to

24

25

1	put a number on that then so then you might still
2	find overall the price was unfair, but maybe at that
3	point you would want to adjust your cost-plus benchmark
4	for the appropriate amount of economic value. But as
5	I said, I do not think that there is any reason here to
6	adjust for economic value, and so I would not make such
7	a distinction in practice, but I can see that in
8	principle it is potentially relevant.
9	MR RIDYARD: So you think the value element should be there,
10	but you just happen to think the value is zero?
11	MR PARKER: I do not think there is any additional value
12	over and above that contained in the cost-plus
13	benchmark, so that is my view. I can see that in
14	principle that could be adjusted.
15	MR RIDYARD: In the joint statement, I noticed there was
16	discussion about a possible "buffer", which I think was
17	a phrase that, Dr Jenkins, you seem to have introduced
18	first of all, but Mr Parker, you also sort of addressed
19	that question too.
20	Is that something has that already been accounted
21	for in discussions you have already had, or was that
22	something additional, Dr Jenkins?
23	DR JENKINS: I think perhaps, as one of the questions was
24	worded about the difference between the non-infringing
25	price and the price that would emerge from workable

competition, and I think, as Mr Parker said, it is quite difficult to know exactly what price would emerge from workable competition, but one can think about what prices could emerge from workable competition and so there is this range.

Now, the approach that I have brought forward with the SAC combinatorial, my position, and the fact that I have taken an upper bound range, is implicitly saying when you have a range of prices that could arise you take the upper end of that range and at that point you do not need much of a buffer, for want of a better word, and that is what I have introduced.

However, to the extent you have a range of prices that could arise and you choose a price that is towards the lower end of the prices that could arise, then there might be more need for consideration of a buffer so as not to choose a price and quantify loss on a price that would reflect a price below a fair price, if that makes sense. Sorry, if you have a range and all of those prices could be considered fair, and you take a lower end of the range, then you might want to include a buffer even having decided to select the lower end as your cost-plus benchmark.

MR RIDYARD: Is that not just another way of saying that you do not think we should have taken the lower price?

1	DR JENKINS: I think there are different ways of determining
2	what is a fair price and, as I say, there is uncertainty
3	about how to judge costs in the presence of common
4	costs, and firms will allocate those in different ways,
5	so
6	MR RIDYARD: I think we understand all of the difficulties
7	and the arguments on both sides, but I do not think
8	I do not see anything I cannot see anything
9	additional here that we have not already been through.
10	DR JENKINS: No, I was just explaining that where the word
11	"buffer" came from in my report was to say if you have a
12	range and you choose the lower end, you may wish to
13	include a buffer, which could be the same as the
14	significant and persistent element.
15	MR RIDYARD: Yes.
16	DR JENKINS: I guess, in that, I would say that having
17	a view of the upper end of that range could help you
18	determine what the size of that buffer is.
19	MR RIDYARD: Mr Parker, anything further to add on this
20	before we move on?
21	MR PARKER: No, I do not think so.
22	MR RIDYARD: Thanks.
23	Then we have a couple of questions about this gifted
24	broadband, which I think is pretty small in the scheme
25	of things, but there is just a question about what we do

l	about the situation this is where non-BT employees
2	have been gifted broadband by a BT employee and whether
3	we treat those customers as being in the Class and, if
4	so, how we deal with any losses they may have suffered.

MR PARKER: Yes. I do not think they should be excluded, that is because if you think about a counterfactual where SFV services were at a fair price, they would still be getting gifted broadband. I do not see that there is any connection between being given this gift and any excessive pricing on SFV services, and I do not think there has been any suggestion that people would not be given these gifts absent an excessive price.

So I think these are just two separate things. They happened -- these people happened to get gifted broadband, and that is a policy that BT, you know, that BT offers to its staff, to make these gifts. But I do not think there is any reason to exclude them, because people are still paying excessive prices on their residential SFV services.

MR RIDYARD: Dr Jenkins.

DR JENKINS: I did not opine on the nature of the decision about gifted customers. I think the BT position is these customers can be thought of like a bundle customer, because they are receiving overall broadband

1	and voice for the price of the voice line, and other
2	bundle customers pay the voice price plus the
3	incremental price for broadband. I think one would
4	actually need some evidence on what those gifted
5	customers are using it for. Would they have taken
6	broadband in a bundle alternatively?
7	They are a very small number of the claim, so
8	I did not do any investigation of the nature of those
9	customers.
10	MR RIDYARD: Do we know how many there were of these
11	customers?
12	DR JENKINS: Yes, I think it is 0.3 to 0.6 of the lines
13	before April 2018, and 0.6 to 1.8 after, and that might
14	be in the JES. I did take a note of the numbers.
15	MR RIDYARD: Okay. That is okay, I do not think we need to
16	•••
17	DR JENKINS: I can get you the reference.
18	MR RIDYARD: I do not think there is much more to say on
19	that just now, so we can move on to the business
20	customers. Here we want to know, just in terms of the
21	economic expertise, whether you as experts have got
22	anything to add to this topic.
23	As a matter of economics, Mr Parker, I mean, should
24	the business customers be excluded from the Class?
25	MR PARKER: I do not think so. I think they paid the, by

1	this stage, excessive prices on their SFV services and
2	I think that tells you that they are in, at least from
3	an economic perspective. They paid too much for the
4	services they were using.
5	MR RIDYARD: Because in the counterfactual they would have
6	paid a competitive price and just a gap, like any other
7	customer.
8	MR PARKER: That is my view.
9	MR RIDYARD: Dr Jenkins, do you have a view on this?
10	DR JENKINS: No, I think they are clearly Class Members.
11	There is a legal argument about the contractual position
12	I think that BT has put forward. So I think the
13	evidence I have put forward is more about the number of
14	them in the Class, and also the comparator products
15	perhaps being different for this group, so under limb 2.
16	If they are in the Class you could consider that what is
17	considered a fair price for them would also you would
18	take into account the price that business customers
19	would have paid, and I have presented that in my second
20	report.
21	MR RIDYARD: Okay, so that latter element, though, that is
22	introducing a sort of economic element. Is it in
23	a way it is really I guess that is close to the
24	legal arguments in a way, is it not, that second point?
25	DR JENKINS: I think from the legal perspective there is

1	a sort of bright line question about are they in or out?
2	If they are in, then they are different from residential
3	consumers, so once they are in you may wish to consider
4	what is a fair price for those small business customers.
5	THE CHAIRMAN: Which you would do at the limb 2 stage.
6	DR JENKINS: Which I do at the limb 2 stage, and that might
7	be different from the considerations you bring to bear
8	with respect to residential consumers.
9	MR RIDYARD: Mr Parker, do you have any reaction to that
10	particular issue?
11	MR PARKER: I think I agree that if you are going to think
12	about business customers or some business customers
13	being excluded, you do that in limb 2(ii), rather than
14	at this stage. At this stage we are talking about
15	quantum and the business customers are in.
16	MR RIDYARD: But the idea there might be a different
17	benchmark for a different competitive benchmark for
18	the business customers than for the non-business
19	customers?
20	MR PARKER: I think once you have got to quantum, I am not
21	sure we know I do not think we have a different
22	competitive benchmark for business customers. I think
23	it is the same benchmark at that point.
24	THE CHAIRMAN: Could I just follow on, just on this limb 2
25	point with these business customers.

_	if economics do not have anything to offer on that
2	and it is purely a point of law, say so. Can I just
3	start with Mr Parker. If the notion is: yes, but the
4	fact is that the product they should have been on would
5	have cost them more in any event, is that limited to
6	a limb 2(ii) or could this be a limb 2(i) question?
7	I say that, of course, because the Class
8	Representative's primary case is based on limb 2(i),
9	unfair in itself, but could that still be a question of
L 0	fairness that could be brought in at that point?
L1	MR PARKER: I think it might be a legal question.
L2	THE CHAIRMAN: I just want to give you the opportunity for
L3	something to say. If there is not, then that is where
L 4	it will be debated.
L5	MR PARKER: Yes, I think I can see how it comes into
L6	limb 2(ii) as a kind of comparator and you have my views
L7	on that, but I am not sure it comes in separately to
L8	limb 2(i) in the way that I have been thinking about it,
L9	but there may be a legal issue there.
20	DR JENKINS: Yes, I think it could be under both parts of
21	limb 2, that consideration about the treatment of
22	business customers.
23	MR RIDYARD: Right. So maybe we should move on to the point
24	where there has been quite some discussion, and that is
25	estimating the size of the business customers and how

1	important they are in terms of the Class overall. We
2	have a number of issues here, but including the
3	difference between the Ofcom survey estimates and the
4	internal BT estimates.

5 Mr Parker, would you like to kick off on this one, 6 please.

7 MR PARKER: Yes. So, as you say, there are basically two 8 sources of data, there are some Ofcom surveys and there 9 are some BT internal documents. The Ofcom surveys -- so 10 it seems that there might be two types of business 11 customer. There are business customers who are 12 essentially residential customers and who look like --13 who use their home phones occasionally to make 14 a business call, and then there are business customers 15 who might -- who are using residential home services but 16 seem to be doing it in some kind of separate way and 17 using a sort of dedicated line for the purpose.

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The BT documents are trying to estimate the number on that second category, so the people who have multiple lines. Now, there might be other reasons why they have multiple lines, but I think BT's view is they are the most likely to be business customers, kind of separating out their business usage.

I think the Ofcom -- the Jigsaw surveys that are carried out for Ofcom do not exclude the idea that there

may be a number of customers that are -- there may be quite a lot of customers that are just residential customers that are occasionally using a home phone landline to make business calls. If you like, they are doing that as something -- you work from home occasionally and you make a business call or something on your landline. I mean, I think it may be helpful to turn up some of the documents here because there is -- I think it is worth just seeing them, if you forgive me.

So if we can go to {C/398.1/106}. This is a 2022 survey. If we could zoom in a little bit. Really here I am interested in the questions. The question is about how much control do you have for making purchasing decisions in relation to communications services.

Then if you go to page -- so what you see is almost everyone, 97%, say they have their own budget. So we can zoom in actually a bit on that point. Thank you. So that is 2,055, the 97% figure. Then jump out and go to page {C/398.1/108}, and then if we can zoom in on the line "Solely ... responsible", you will see the vast majority of those people have 85% and then 13%. So people are either solely responsible or jointly responsible, and I think that is 85% and 24%, and there is a very -- 75% -- there is a small group of people who are -- someone else has primary responsibility.

What is essentially going on here is this is primarily micro businesses, so people with 1-5, 1-9 employees, many of whom will be likely sole traders, I think.

Then if we could go to -- so that is just to say
many of these people will likely be -- if you were
a sole trader and you were asked the question: am
I responsible for telecoms services in my company? You
would say, yes, you are that person, I expect.

Then if we go to {C/398.2/153} and we zoom in there. So this is, if you have a landline service, do you have a specific business tariff or do you have a personal residential service? What we see there is about 50%, I think it is just over 50%, have a residential contract only. About -- I cannot really read those terribly well -- I think it is about 11% have a business contract only, and then another group have business, about 11%, have business and personal contracts.

If we go to the next page, {C/398.2/154}, and we zoom in on the "Home/office working" bit, then you can see that there is a set of people who -- some of whom work from the office, some of whom are hybrid working, and some of whom are mainly homeworking, and then a slightly larger percentage -- I think you will need to look at the underlying PDFs to really properly get

a handle on this to see the exact numbers, but there is quite a large proportion of the working from home people who are personal contracts only.

Then if we can go on to page {C/398.2/159}, this is:

"Why have you chosen not to have a business service
for your landline service?"

Then most people say: a personal contract is fine for my business. Some people say: a business contract is more expensive. Some people say: I have never thought about it, and so on.

So what this is -- you cannot tell precisely, but what this is suggesting to me is there is quite a few people in this survey who are likely to be people who are using their home phone as a residential customer and they are using it as a business.

I do not think we need to turn it up. The 2016 survey, which is  $\{C/346.1/14\}$ , has a quote saying:

"... micro businesses and sole traders often use residential packages. This is particularly the case among people who work from home and whose residential and business [packages] are one and the same."

So that is again suggesting the 2016 survey was reaching a similar sort of conclusion, and I think the levels of sort of working from home and hybrid working are somewhat less in the 2016 survey as you might

1	expect.
2	So those are the survey data. I think it is just
3	worth going into them.
4	The BT data, there are a few different documents
5	here. So if we can go to $\{F/433/1\}$ . I think this is
6	something I think that BT was this is slides for
7	Ofcom, so it is BT when it was engaging with Ofcom
8	throughout the review process.
9	If you go to slide $\{F/433/7\}$ , if you have that
10	second bullet there, number 2:
11	"[About] 100k of solus lines are either business
12	lines or second lines."
13	So that is the 100k figure. I think that relates
14	to we can see what has been basically the way this
15	starts is, and there is a number of these charts which
16	we will come to where you start with the total base of
17	BT customers. In this case, we are taking out those
18	with broadband with another provider, so we are taking
19	out the split supplier customers, so that 100k is
20	a combination of Voice Only and split service customers.
21	If we go to $\{F/434/3\}$ , if you zoom in on the bit in
22	the middle with the bullets saying:
23	"A mixture of data sources"
24	So you can see there the last bullet is the most
25	important:

L	"The figure of 0.1m was sourced from our
2	customer database [people] with multiple voice
3	assets on the same billing account multiple bills at
4	the same address"
5	And so on and so forth. So this was BT's approach

And so on and so forth. So this was BT's approach to getting to that 100k figure. So those two relate to that single figure of 100k.

At {F/821/28} we have a similar figure. This is a document of 28 January 2018, so this is about when BT was thinking about who is eligible for the Commitments. So you start with the total landline base, so we have another one of these sort of waterfalls. They take out standalone broadband customers, they take out Basic and Home Phone Saver, and they take out BB Elsewhere, which is split supplier, so BT solus BB I think is split service customers. They take out those three groups.

Then there is a couple of groups -- you can see at the top it says: who may receive the discount because people need to opt in. Then there is e-billers who they think are own broadband and therefore are not Voice Only customers, and multiple lines which is -- the most likely reason BT says is that they run home businesses.

That "2k" I think that is in that slide on "Multiple lines" is a typo. I think that should read "20k".

So that is document number 2.

1	Document number 3, we will see this is a bit later
2	on. This is 629, I am so sorry. My fault.
3	$\{F/629/13\}$ . We have another version of this chart. You
4	can see a similar basically similar numbers, slightly
5	updated because this is now January 2019. Then again
6	you have "20k" which suggests confirms, I think, the
7	view taken on the previous chart that that was a typo.
8	Then if we do $\{F/723/13\}$ . So this is a document
9	that I think relates to some kind of IT migration
10	programme and they are talking here about the
11	"Multiple PSTN lines" is multiple land lines, and there
12	we have 15,000 nationally.
13	This looks like it might be all customers with
14	multiple landlines rather than just Voice Only, because
15	you can see at the top of that slide we have got two
16	references to solus, and there is not a reference to
17	solus in this, so but maybe it is also Voice Only.
18	The date on this I think is mid-2021. But it is not
19	completely clear, someone might need to check the
20	metadata on that one, but there are references in it to
21	sort of various stages of when things need to be
22	delivered.
23	So all of those so those I think are the data
24	points that we have or the data sources that we have.

I had originally, in my first report or third report,

found two of those and I had taken the average, and the numbers were I think 17% from the original Jigsaw survey and 4% from the 100k figure.

Following Dr Jenkins' first reports, which were based on the 2022 survey, I had a look at that. I also found some other BT internal documents saying 20k, 20k and 15k, and it seemed to me that we were getting numbers -- I did not feel I had a reason to move away from the intermediate position that I had taken between these data points.

So the data points were -- the BT internal data points are sub-10%, perhaps down to more like 2%, 3%, 4% for the 2020 15k type numbers, and then the surveys I think go from 17%, although I think that has been revised to 14%, and up to 28%, I believe.

So there are a lot of different data points out there. I think the surveys are probably an overestimate because they will include quite a few personal customers, residential customers who occasionally use lines to make business calls. I think it is possible that the BT estimates are a lower bound, because they do not need to be given such customers, and they are only multiple line customers, and maybe there are some people out there who are running a business on a single phone line, so I have taken a middle view on those data

- 1 points.
- 2 Sorry, it was a very long-winded answer, but I think
- 3 probably helpful to get the data points out so they can
- 4 be discussed.
- 5 MR RIDYARD: No, that is very useful. Thank you, Mr Parker.
- 6 Dr Jenkins, can you comment on that, please.
- 7 DR JENKINS: Yes. So I think maybe starting with the nature
- 8 of the surveys that were conducted on behalf of Ofcom,
- 9 they were conducted from a list of small and medium
- sized enterprises, so that is what the survey company
- 11 used, and they did use quite a lot of pre-questioning to
- 12 ensure, I think Mr Parker showed a few of the detailed
- 13 tables, to ensure they were getting the person who made
- 14 the decisions about their telephony purchases.
- 15 So it was not like they randomly called numbers and
- therefore you would likely get residential people at
- home, working at home, who use their phone for
- work-related things when they are at home. The survey
- 19 design is targeted at SMEs in the UK and starts from
- a list of SMEs. I do not actually have the page
- 21 reference, but we could -- I can get that, you know, or
- 22 we can go to one of the documents and go to that
- appendix to it to just see how the surveys were set up,
- if that would be useful.
- 25 We can do that. So it is  $\{C/357/1\}$  is the 2016

document. Maybe if you go over to the contents page, because I do not have the specific page reference with me. So even maybe keep going to the "Methodology and sample", I think that actually does give an overview in the exec summary. {C/357/5}

So the sample was sourced from Dun & Bradstreet, which is a company which keeps a record of small and medium sized enterprises. Then there is a table explaining that they oversampled the 0-4 category, but they still only surveyed, I think, 250 in that group, and then I think it is about 250 in the next group up to 10, and then the rest are the larger SMEs.

So it is very much the case that these surveys are useful, in that they are targeted at small to medium sized enterprises and asking them about how they get their supplies.

If we then go to {E/25/152}, which is the annexes to my first report where I set out how I used this information. So if you zoom in on the figure. I think one of the things that is really important here and explains the difference between the numbers that come out of the survey, and the numbers that come out of BT documents that Mr Parker has relied on, is the fact that you need to understand that there are many more split purchase business customers taking SFV than there are

Voice Only business customers, and in the -- because of the detailed questions that we can rely on from the surveys, I was able to identify from the surveys of those SMEs whether or not they are buying -- whether or not they are VOs or SPs and buying the residential SFV contract.

So you look at those who are purchasing a landline product, then there are questions which enable you to know whether they are purchasing any other voice or internet service, and then if they say they are purchasing a broadband product, you can -- there are questions which ask whether or not that is a bundled purchase or an unbundled purchase. So you can determine: are they a Voice Only or an SP, and then you can cross-tab that with whether or not they are on a residential contract or a business contract.

So in terms of the information we actually need to answer this question, given BT itself does not know this, I think this is the best quality information that is available to answer the question of BT's SFV customers, what proportion are businesses.

Now, I have to assume that the market results that I am getting from these surveys are similar to those that would be observed for BT, because I do not have BT's specific information here.

1	Then if you go over to $\{E/25/157\}$ and zoom in on
2	table A11.8 at the bottom of the page. (Pause) I
3	have it says "OR" but I can see them, so maybe there
4	is an IR version? Or maybe it is OR, actually
5	{OR-E/25/157}. Yes, there we go.

So you see that from this survey evidence it suggests that around 4% of residential SFV lines are SMEs purchasing Voice Only, which is the sort of number that Mr Parker has relied on, but the number of SMEs purchasing SP -- yes, SPs, is much higher at between 10 and up to 22-25% at the end of the period.

I think the reason that information -- those documents on which Mr Parker has relied relate to identifying customers with respect to the Carmen discount, quite a few of the ones which he has referred to, and obviously that is Voice Only customers, and wanting to ensure that they do not offer the Carmen discount to businesses, and they are going to send out coupons to Voice Only customers who they have doubt about whether they are a residential consumer.

I think, similarly, that last table that

Mr Parker -- last slide was about digital switch-off,

actually, or the move over to digital from copper voice.

So again it is a focus on Voice Only customers.

So I think that is how those two bits of information

1	fit together. But actually what we are interested in
2	for the claim, to the extent that it becomes important,
3	how many SME customers are in our SFV customer base, the
4	bulk of the SMEs are purchasing split purchase
5	contracts, because almost all small and medium sized
6	enterprises in Britain have internet access, so they are
7	all Split Purchase Customers predominantly.
8	So I have maintained that these are the best numbers

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to rely on. It is independent survey evidence. It is done on behalf of Ofcom based on good reasonable marketing approaches. It is -- what I am relying on here is simply what the survey customers say about themselves, we do not even rely on anything else they say, but just on what are the products they are taking.

So in my view, this is the most reliable evidence, and taking some average, which is I think implicitly an average between Voice Only and all SFV, does not -- it does not lead to an accurate estimate.

MR RIDYARD: Sorry, I did not understand that last -- the last comment there.

DR JENKINS: Because what Mr Parker has done is take 4% from the BT numbers and 14 or 17% from the first Jigsaw and taken an average of those, but they are not similar -they are not actually similar numbers such that you could average them.

- 1 MR RIDYARD: I see what you mean, yes. Okay.
- Is this analysis that we are looking at here, is
- 3 this going to help us to deal with the legal issues that
- 4 we have got to deal with on this too? Because I do not
- 5 know how that legal argument will pan out and where we
- 6 will come out on it, of course, but is it possible that
- 7 the legal question might differentiate between different
- 8 kinds of business users? So, for example, the people
- 9 working from home versus the businesses, the two kinds
- 10 of businesses that we talked about earlier, the
- 11 businesses where there really is a business account but
- 12 the business has chosen to avoid the business charges by
- 13 pretending it is a personal account.
- 14 DR JENKINS: I would need to go back and look at the
- 15 cross-tab, how much cross-tabbing you could do. Because
- I think what you are saying is: could one identify, of
- 17 SMEs that are mostly working at home and mostly small,
- 18 what proportion of them are on business versus
- 19 residential contracts?
- 20 MR RIDYARD: Yes.
- 21 DR JENKINS: So I would just need to go back, because
- 22 sometimes you cannot do every cross-tab that you would
- 23 like to do in the information that is shared from these
- 24 surveys.
- 25 MR RIDYARD: Mr Parker, more generally, any responses to

1 Dr Jenkins' assessment there?

MR PARKER: I mean, I think that the main issue of the surveys is that we cannot do that distinction that we just described so we do not know whether there are -- which customers in the year are, if you like, true business customers and which customers are using a personal tab and occasionally making some calls that-- are business calls from home, particularly in a world where more people have moved to hybrid working, you can see that might have made quite a bit of difference to the percentages.

I think that is my nervousness about just relying on the survey evidence, is that you may well be caught by the survey because you are a business and they ring you up and they say: do you use -- "what sort of tariff do you use?", and if you happen to work from home or work occasionally from home and make a call from there, then you may well say: yes, I am in charge of my telecom services and this is what I do and this is the contract that I use and there is a significant proportion of people there on residential tariffs, as one of the tables you will be able to look at when it is slightly less blurry in one of the references that I gave but it is the table QD3 and QD5B of the cross-tabs I think. I could not find one that genuinely answered the

1	question. That was the issue, so there is only
2	they have published an awful lot of cross-tabs but
3	inevitably there is never the cross-tab that you really
4	want when you get the data in that form and I am not
5	aware of a way to get to the kind of the numbers that
6	you would ideally like.

7 DR JENKINS: I think here what this survey will not capture is people who are working from home on a given day but 9 whose place of business is not -- main place of business 10 is not their home. They are not going to be calling up 11 just any residential number and say: are you 12 occasionally working from home? So that is not 13 a concern. It would be where the SME is registered to 14 a home address, an address that is a shared address 15 because that is how it would be in the Dun & Bradstreet database. 16

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So I think there may be other people who are taking business calls at home but that is not who is being captured here and that is why I think this survey does not fall foul of that challenge and therefore is a reasonable basis for genuine businesses that are using residential products because they say that meets their business needs and they do not need anything more.

MR RIDYARD: Would you accept that, Mr Parker?

MR PARKER: I think there is definitely something to that

Τ	but I think there is quite a few people working hybrid
2	or there might be people who have an office but also
3	work from home on occasion and take the occasional call
4	so I think there is something to it but I think it does
5	not completely rule out you will have too many customers
6	in this data who are
7	MR RIDYARD: If we turn it round and look at the BT internal
8	estimates, I mean, simply focusing on consumers who have
9	two lines, that does sound like a big, essentially a big
10	understatement of business users; would you accept that?
11	MR PARKER: Yes, which is why I have used a number which is
12	in the middle of these different data sources and ended
13	up at just over 10%.
14	DR JENKINS: But if we go back to $\{F/629/1\}$ I think it was,
15	was one of the documents Mr Parker referred to.
16	MR PARKER: It is page {F/629/13}.
17	DR JENKINS: So you see here the 20k multiple lines point is
18	taken from the Voice Only but above you have got
19	broadband elsewhere, a big grey box. Now, there is no
20	investigation about whether any of those have multiple
21	lines or whatever, so that is the split purchase
22	category in that box. But because BT were not
23	interested in that group because this is about the
24	Carmen discount, so they are only interested in
25	identifying businesses who are Voice Only, that is why

1	that 20k is an underestimate, (a) because it is looking
2	at multiple lines but it is not actually looking at all
3	the Split Purchase Customers either.
4	MR RIDYARD: Okay. Thanks. I just have a couple of small
5	questions on this topic. Maybe we could cover those
6	before we break. One is about VAT and that seems like
7	quite a small point but really about information about
8	whether we know what proportion of business customers
9	were VAT registered. Is that something that we know
LO	about, Dr Jenkins?
11	DR JENKINS: I think that is agreed and it is 9.3.3 of the
L2	joint statement. It is coming from the Ofcom survey
L3	data but I believe Mr Parker has agreed with the
L 4	estimate that comes out of the survey evidence; is that
L5	right?
L 6	MR PARKER: Yes, that is right.
L7	MR RIDYARD: Okay, good.
L8	Then the final question was about pass on. Assuming
L9	that we have some of these business customers in the
20	claim, I mean, is there a pass on story here that we
21	should be worried about?
22	MR PARKER: So my view was I do not think there is in this
23	case because these businesses will be very small
24	businesses. They are likely to be operating in
25	competitive markets. They will be facing other

businesses who have differently optimised their cost structure and, my presumption, not facing excessive pricing on their telecom services and therefore it is not a market wide cost increase. They are in these competitive markets. They will not be able to pass it on. That is my view from theory.

Then we do not actually know who any of these customers are and so we have no way of telling in practice, demonstrating in practice that any pass on did occur so there is a practical issue but I think there is a conceptual reason not to expect there to be any pass on.

MR RIDYARD: Dr Jenkins, any views on that?

DR JENKINS: Yes. So I agree that unfortunately we do not know really very much at all about these businesses, so it makes it very hard to answer the pass on question because I think it is -- we are talking about the whole economy so these SMEs could be operating in a wide range of different product markets.

Where I disagree with Mr Parker is that likely they are competing with rival businesses that may well be paying business telephony tariffs rather than the residential ones and those are likely to be higher, so it is possible they would be able to pass it on because the prevailing market price will be set on for a higher

1 cost telephony product.

However, there are likely to be lots of differences in cost structures in those markets so it is very hard to actually quantify that pass on effect. It may well not be zero but I was not able to provide a reliable estimate of that pass on.

MR RIDYARD: I did not think that was the point Mr Parker was making about pass on. I thought he was simply saying that whatever level of charges they are paying their competitors would not be affected by the excess pricing, and so -- if they were currently managing to pay much less than their competitors because they had managed to get their telecoms account on a cheaper basis than the business tariff, that they are still setting their prices in the marketplace against competitors who are paying the business tariff, and it is that difference that Mr Parker was referring to I think.

DR JENKINS: Yes, so I guess the normal argument about you cannot pass it on if it is a price shock just to you is where you would not be able to because you would become uncompetitive. Now, obviously we are in imperfectly competitive markets and if your rivals actually are paying higher costs it may be that you do have some trade off here. If we could actually do the pass on analysis you may find that in this situation.

1	MR RIDYARD: All right. Thanks. I think it is probably
2	a good point for the transcriber break.
3	THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Thank you very much.
4	MR RIDYARD: Let us reconvene in about 10 minutes.
5	(11.44 am)
6	(A short break)
7	(11.59 am)
8	MR RIDYARD: Right, so we will now turn to the topic of
9	adjusting the overcharge estimate to account for the
10	consumer's time preference for money now rather than in
11	the future.
12	Mr Parker, I think maybe it is best to address this
13	first question to you. We are talking first of all then
14	about this inflation adjustment. So can you explain to
15	us what role any inflation-based elements to the damages
16	plays relative to interest charges in accounting for
17	this time value of money?
18	MR PARKER: Yes. My view is, absent the overcharge,
19	residential customers would have had more money at
20	certain historic periods. They could have done two
21	things basically with that money. They could have spent
22	it or they could have saved it. I am using "saved" as
23	a shorthand here for increased savings or paid down
24	debts, but I will just say "saved" to speed things up.
25	If they had spent it, let us say this was damage in

1	the month of October 2015, then they would have been
2	able to purchase goods if they had spent £100, they
3	would have been able to purchase goods worth £100 at
4	2015 prices. If they are going to be ultimately
5	compensated, let us say, in 2025, so ten years later,
6	then that £100 is no longer worth what it was in 2015.
7	So there is, I think, a need in terms of compensation,
8	or adequate compensation, to uprate the proportion that
9	they will have spent for inflation and then the
10	proportion they would have saved for interest.

But conceptually I think it is two different things, and, focusing on the interest bit, I think that applies to the amount that they would have spent at the time they had the money.

MR RIDYARD: Sorry, say that last bit again, please.

MR PARKER: So if they had been overcharged by £200 in 2015, and they would have spent £100 of that at the time, then they would have been able to purchase goods at 2015 prices, and for that £100 they are only going to get that £100 back in 2025, and to the extent that they want to continue to spend it, they can, assuming their choice between spending and saving is the same, they will only be able to get goods at 2025 prices, which are quite a lot more expensive than 2015 prices.

MR RIDYARD: That consumption element, then, which you

Τ	suggested using the inflation figure for, that would
2	compensate them for the fact that the product they will
3	have bought then may have gone up in price today, but it
4	would not compensate them for the fact that they had to
5	wait, whatever, five or more years to get hold of the
6	product?
7	MR PARKER: Yes, I am not making a further adjustment for
8	some kind of time preference for spending today versus
9	spending in the future, that is correct.
10	MR RIDYARD: But why not?
11	MR PARKER: That is a fair point. I had not I had
12	thought that inflation adjustment was a good way of
13	thinking about this question. I think if you wanted to
14	do a time preference adjustment, then you would want
15	to you would need to have an estimate of the sort of
16	underlying rate of time preference over consumption,
17	which I have not investigated, but I can see
18	conceptually that that could potentially be relevant.
19	MR RIDYARD: Okay.
20	Dr Jenkins, where do you stand on what Mr Parker has
21	just described?
22	DR JENKINS: I think there is a lot of legal precedent
23	around how this question is treated, and almost to
24	answer that question about how has time value of money
25	been treated in cases like this, I think that is the

simple interest approach that has been used, which is to reflect the time value of money aspect of awards.

If we then say, okay, from the economics perspective how do we think about this? I think one needs to start from even the framing of what the harm is, and I think the harm that is alleged here is that prices were too high for the SFV services, so the amount that is being quantified is how much extra has been paid for those SFV services.

Now, then even the next step, which is to say: oh, and we can say that the way a consumer would have experienced that is to have extra income, as opposed to actually at the time it would have been a change in relative prices, okay, so you know, the cost of SFV services would have been lower against other products, so maybe they would have adjusted their consumption pattern in response to that, versus the predicate for Mr Parker which is, well, you can think of that as income and then we use a marginal propensity to consume, because that is the first thing you have to do in order to be able to then say, well, there was an element that would have been used to consume other products at the time.

Then you have the question, which is the inflation adjustment that Mr Parker is suggesting, I think it is

1 like a spending power parity condition through time.

Because it is not actually necessarily compensating for what would have been consumed at the time, because the consumer may well not want to make the same consumption decision. The product may have fallen -- the price of the product may have fallen as much as gone up.

So there are many, many questions around that. But in a sense, there are a set of assumptions that have to be made about what is going on in the counterfactual in order to get a reasonable estimate of what I understand Mr Parker's approach to be, which is sort of a damage on damage approach, which is the standard way for any compounding claim to have been developed in the law, and absent that damage on damage, then you are in a simple interest world.

MR RIDYARD: Obviously we cannot know how the consumers affected would have -- well, we can see that they would have been -- they would have paid out less to BT during the claim period, so they would have had more money in their pockets. We cannot really determine what they would have done with that money, and we do not really even want to get involved in that, I do not think, do we? Because we have got 3 million-odd consumers here, so it is reasonable to make a broad generalisation, is it not, as to, on average, what consumers do with their

1	money,	rather	than	trying	to	evaluate	the	decision	of
2	each or	ne of th	ne 3 r	million?	)				

DR JENKINS: I do not think you necessarily need to know something about each individual consumer, but I think you do want to take into account characteristics of the Class in making these decisions. Mr Parker has done that to some extent, he has made some age adjustments. But there may be aspects that would be knowable about the Class that would make quite a big difference to how they -- whether they would consume or say -- you know, whether they would restrict consumption or continue consuming and fund it through borrowings or less savings. That might be something that was knowable. is not currently knowable with the information that we have available to us.

MR RIDYARD: But in terms of the economics, though, as an economist looking at this question, why would you not just want to look at the whole thing as a question about the time value of money, and just try and get the interest rate right, and then just apply the appropriate interest rate across this period to reflect the fact that these consumers would rather have had the money in 2016 than to have it now?

DR JENKINS: I think, yes, you can do that, but that you then have to say what is the appropriate interest rate,

Τ	in a sense, and I think that is the question. There are
2	a lot of aspects that need to be determined in order to
3	decide what that appropriate interest rate is for
4	a formal compound interest claim, which requires you to
5	show the damage on damage aspect for these customers.
6	Otherwise you do have a more shortcut approach, which is
7	the simple interest approach, which does say, okay, this
8	is going it is hard to know these things, we know
9	there is a time value of money. That is my
10	understanding of why that framework is there in the
11	legal structure.
12	MR RIDYARD: Sorry, but as an economist you would not be
13	would you have a dilemma between choosing compound
14	interest versus simple interest?
15	DR JENKINS: No, not as an economist. The world is
16	generally a compound place and, you know, economists
17	will compound things. There are a few I think as
18	I put in the joint statement, there are few financial
19	instruments that do operate on a simple interest
20	approach, but in general the world is a compound world.
21	MR RIDYARD: Yes.
22	Maybe, Mr Parker, I put it to you. Would you, if
23	you were looking at this just in terms of the economics,
24	would you still want to be making this distinction
25	between consumption and saving?

MR PARKER: I think so, which is why I ha	have done it	t
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I think because, particularly in this end consumer world, I can see for businesses that typically interest has been -- everything has been tied up in relation to interest. I think for the consumers, if you think about what they can do, what they could have done, they could either have spent the money that they would have had or they could have saved it, and those are I think related but conceptually slightly different things, and if they had spent the money, they would have spent it at 2015 prices, and when they get the money back it will be at 2025 prices.

That is one type of -- one type of uprating that you would want to do, which is an inflation-based uprating, and I take your point about kind of the preference for consumption earlier than later, but that is something I have included.

Then on the money they would have saved, then I think it is a matter of thinking about an appropriate interest rate. In either case, for me economically the right thing to do is compound. I think it is very hard to see how -- you cannot achieve simple inflation, I do not really know how that would work. I think in practice, notwithstanding Dr Jenkins' examples, I do not see how Members of the Class could have achieved simple

1	interest on any financial instrument. I am not actually
2	sure that Dr Jenkins' examples are in fact examples of
3	simple interest so much as examples of interest being
4	paid annually in one lump sum, and I think if you look
5	at the underlying economics of those instruments, they
6	probably based themselves on compounding principles.
7	But I am not sure we need to get into that, because I do
8	not see really how they are relevant to the Class.
9	So I would focus on compounding, and I think you
10	could make two different adjustments relating to the two
11	different types of behaviour that customers could carry
12	out.
13	MR RIDYARD: Even though there is a concern that the
14	consumption, one would just be reflecting inflation, but
15	not the preference for flagging something now rather
16	than in the future?
17	MR PARKER: Well, so that would be you would want to
18	make you could make a further adjustment for that,
19	which I have not done, so the inflation update would be
20	an underestimate, I think, to that extent.
21	MR RIDYARD: Okay. I was just puzzled as to why you would
22	not simply roll everything up in the appropriate
23	interest rate.
24	MR PARKER: Real interest rates can go up or down, can they
25	not? They can be above or below the inflation rates.

Τ	So I am not sure maybe the simple approach is to do
2	everything in terms of interest, but I have chosen to
3	I thought one would do it via inflation for the bit that
4	was spent, because that seems to match what customers
5	actually might have done with the extra money, but I do
6	not have a strong view.
7	MR RIDYARD: Okay. Let me just check the notes. (Pause)
8	Dr Jenkins, would you like to come back on
9	Mr Parker's comments about simple interest rates versus
10	compound interest rates?
11	DR JENKINS: Yes. I mean, I think one of the examples
12	I gave was interest only mortgages, so I think that is
13	the nature of a simple interest idea, is something where
14	you pay an element each year so that the principal does
15	not change. It is right there are not that many
16	examples of simple interest in the real world, but
17	I think that and some of the coupons you can get on
18	fixed interest bonds do have the nature of simple
19	interest.
20	But taken on an annual level, that is correct. So
21	it is compounding within the year, and then simple at
22	the end of the year.
23	MR RIDYARD: Okay. Obviously whatever decision we come to
24	on this, we will have to take due account of the legal
25	precedent and so forth, but here I am just trying to

1	focus in on what you, as economists, can add to inform
2	us on the substantive choice, if you like, and, yes,
3	I mean, it did seem that I was expecting you to say
4	that the compounding would be the natural way of doing
5	things.

DR JENKINS: Yes, I mean, I think it is one of those areas where economists generally compound, but the legal framework for damages awards do not necessarily follow the economics logic, and hence economists have assisted courts in assessing interest awards which are framed as damages on damages. So as you say, one could say, well, the world is a compound world and we should compound damages awards, but my understanding is the precedent does not necessarily support that, and hence you have to meet the legal test as it stands.

So that is -- I think both Mr Parker and myself are seeking to assist the Tribunal in that framework, but I definitely agree that in general most aspects of life have a compound element.

MR RIDYARD: Yes, okay. Good.

I do not know that we can take the inflation aspect much further than we have done here already, unless there is anything else you think we should be taking into account? We will talk a bit about interest rates in a moment, but just talk about the inflation

1	adjustment. Is there anything more that should be said
2	here to help us to come to a view on it?
3	Mr Parker.
4	THE CHAIRMAN: Perhaps I can just add to the question there.
5	No, you go ahead and answer that question, and then
6	I have a supplemental for Dr Jenkins. Sorry.
7	MR PARKER: Only that I would agree with the proposition
8	that one should take sort of a broad measure of
9	inflation, which I have used CPI. That seems to me to
10	be a sensible measure which will reflect the CPI's
11	construction from an average basket of goods and
12	services. It seems to me that is the right way to
13	measure an inflation adjustment across a broad Class,
14	such as this, in the absence of a specific CPI for
15	Members of the Class which I do not believe exists.
16	THE CHAIRMAN: Could I ask a supplemental?
17	Dr Jenkins, you do not agree with the inflation
18	approach; and am I right in thinking, I just want to
19	check, if there was something in the inflation approach,
20	you have not put in some different figures for what the
21	split between consumption and savings should be or
22	anything like that.
23	DR JENKINS: I have made a comment on that, but, yes, I have
24	not put forward a full alternative.
25	If we turn to ${IR-E/18/228}$ , which is my second

report. So I agree with Mr Parker that there is likely to be no other better measure of inflation, if one gets to that, than CPI. But the real question is to what does one apply the CPI measure? I think Mr Parker has used an average from a Bank of England -- no, that was right, the chart, thank you -- study on marginal propensities to consume and an average across negative or positive income shocks. I think my view would be you would use the negative income shocks, because there is quite a big difference in how people respond depending on whether money is taken from them and whether money is -- extra money is received by them.

The actual harm is that at the time BT charged higher prices than it should, so the experience that the Class had, if it is cast as an income effect, would have been a reduction in their income at that time, and then the question is how did they respond to having less income because they paid higher prices?

So I think one should look at the negative income results, and I thought -- this is what I was saying earlier about how it affects Class Members might actually be quite different across the Class, and this is from that Bank of England study, and it is showing the distribution of marginal propensities to consume of negative income shocks.

What you see is it is almost bimodal, between 0 and 1, and what that means is there is a reasonably high proportion of the population, 24%, for whom when they had a negative income shock it had no effect on their consumption. That means they just went ahead with the same consumption and it will have been their savings, borrowings, that adjusted to enable them to continue that consumption.

At the other end you have 37, or 37 plus 8, where people, their consumption was heavily affected by the negative income shock, including the fact that they even saved -- consumed even less than the impact of the negative income shock, perhaps, to get a buffer. So you have got like between 37 and 45% of the survey who actually restricted their consumption almost entirely in response to this.

What the survey, the Bank of England survey says is what is determining that is people's financial assets, like do you have savings or not, basically. So that is something that is knowable, and that has a big impact on how you respond to a negative income shock, and that makes perfect sense, if we all imagine, you know, like

So for me, that is the challenge here, is if you follow this approach it is very hard to actually know

for any Class Member. You can use an average. If you were to use an average I would use the average of the negative income shocks, which is a 0.61 marginal propensity to consume rather than the 0.38 that Mr Parker has used. I have, in an annex to my second report, showed the results of making that alternative assumption on marginal propensities to consume with a focus on the impact on the interest award. 

MR RIDYARD: Looking at these numbers, Dr Jenkins, would not a simpler interpretation be to simply say that half of them would have consumed less, and therefore would be due some kind of compensation for the fact they wanted to consume and they were not — they did not, and the other half would have drawn down their savings, and therefore it would have cost them whatever they were getting from their savings accounts?

DR JENKINS: Yes, you could use that to use that as the half and half. I guess that is -- probably the 0.61 is the average that you get across that. So if you are going to use an average, then you would use the average of the negative shock, and that is what I have quantified. But if what you need to know is are Class Members actually different, as opposed to are they all well characterised by an average, then I think this would say they are not well characterised by an average, but an average might

- 1 be what you need to use.
- 2 MR RIDYARD: Mr Parker, any thoughts on that?

3 MR PARKER: So I would agree that I think you need to use an

4 average. I am not sure we can do better given the

5 information that we have.

On the question of whether you should use -- whether you think of this as a positive shock or a negative shock, I must admit I was not sure, because what we are trying to do is look at the situation between the factual and the counterfactual. What we know is that in the factual there was a higher price, and in the counterfactual there would be a lower price. But do you treat that as being in the counterfactual it is a negative shock because you have lost the higher price, or do you say, well, in the counterfactual you never had the positive shock of the higher price?

I do not conceptually I think have an answer to that question, because these are -- if you like, they are two parallel states of the world that are happening at the same time. Whereas the evidence that the Bank of England was looking at is when you have an actual change, whether that is a positive or negative change, you are looking at the change over time.

So that is the reason that I had taken the average between the positive and the negative shock, because

1	Ι	did	not	have	а	sort	of	clear	conceptual	reason	to
2	fa	avour	one	ove	c t	the of	the	r.			

MR RIDYARD: Yes, that is clear, thank you, yes.

Just before we leave the consumption question, we had a question about whether for business customers it might be different from domestic customers, assuming we had business customers in our damage calculation at all of course. Is there any reason to think that would be different as between the business and consumers?

MR PARKER: The way I suggested dealing with this issue, which I had not originally thought about, but I can see it is relevant, is I would say true businesses you should think of as having an inflation-only adjustment -- sorry, an interest-only adjustment as in a sort of standard damages case, and residential customers who occasionally make a business call, I would suggest that the approach of treating them as a residential customer, so a combination of an inflation

In the joint statement at 9.4.8, which is page 221, we do not need to turn it up, it is just for your notes, I have suggested using data from the Bank of England on the weighted average interest rates on new advances to small and medium sized enterprises, so basically the rate at which SMEs could borrow as being the appropriate

and an interest based approach.

1	interest rate for business customers who were facing
2	this overcharge.
3	MR RIDYARD: Dr Jenkins?
4	DR JENKINS: Yes, I think I had pointed out that for both
5	businesses and deceased customers Mr Parker had sort of
6	done a uniform spread across the whole Class, and that
7	would not be appropriate. So I agree that you would
8	need to do a business-specific you would need to
9	consider businesses separately, and I have not looked
10	into detail on the actual rate that Mr Parker has
11	suggested.
12	MR RIDYARD: Then for deceased claimants or is there any
13	reason to think that, assuming that money would then go
14	to their executors or their estate, is there any reason
15	to think that whoever ended up with that money would be
16	different from the original consumers with their
17	consumers?
18	MR PARKER: Yes, this is I found this a very it is
19	a very nuanced question which I had not previously
20	thought about before this case, I have to admit.
21	So these people, the people before they died, would
22	have spent the money and so on, and then they did die.
23	I think the way that I agree this is where the
24	inflation and interest things come together. There
25	probably is a break point once you have once the sort

of probate process has been finalised and it no longer is -- if you like, there is no Class Member at that point, because the Class Member has died and the executors have taken forward the will, and they have distributed it to a further group of people, and those are outside the Class.

So I think the way I have thought about it is you do the inflation and interest adjustments up to the point of death, as for any customer. Then you do a year's worth of interest on the assets that currently stand for that customer, so in this case whatever the overcharges are at that point. Obviously they are not facing an overcharge after the point of death, but on the original overcharge, so there is a year of interest and then that is it.

I think that is the way I have thought about it.

I can see that you might think, well, if they had died,
maybe you just do interest all the way up to the year
after death. But then you are distinguishing between
people who died during the period and people who did not
in terms of what their behaviour is. That feels to me
more complicated than doing it the way I suggested, but
I must admit I do not have a strong view either way as
to which of those is appropriate.

MR RIDYARD: Dr Jenkins, do you have anything on the

1	deceased?
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2 DR JENKINS: I think similarly to the business customers I sort of flagged that I did not think that the approach as suggested made sense with respect to the deceased. 5 Mr Parker said he would make further adjustments in any subsequent quantification which I think one would need 6 7 to have a look at to see whether or not they do indeed make sense.

> I think, yes, it is sort of a nuance once one decides -- the Tribunal decides the framework for this. It may or may not be important to have quite granular approaches to the different types of Class Members depending on how the overall question gets answered.

MR RIDYARD: Thanks. Then let us move on then to the award of interest. I suppose we have talked already about compound v simple interest. I am not sure there is anything more to say on that unless you feel that something has not been covered on that particular aspect.

Really I suppose the most interesting question is: what would be the appropriate rate of interest? would we go about setting the appropriate rate of interest to the extent the interest rates were applicable? Mr Parker, would you like to go first on that.

1	MR PARKER: Yes, in the way that I have thought about it is
2	there is a range of financial assets both debt and
3	savings that consumers could have either reduced their
4	debts or increased their savings. The way I have taken
5	it is to say, well, what is the outstanding balance of
6	each of these debt and savings instruments and assume
7	that consumers put any overcharge that is saved into
8	those assets in proportion to the outstanding balance of
9	the assets and then calculate the interest rate on each
10	of those, in each of those savings or debt products and
11	take a weighted damage across the whole.

I pointed out in my first report and subsequently that ideally one would not do this looking at the average of the asset. You would want to look at not about the stock of assets that people hold but about the incremental inputs into different asset classes as a result of the overcharge but I do not think any data is available on that and therefore I have used the stock of the different savings and debt products as a proxy for how people might on average have saved any excess money that they would not have spent.

MR RIDYARD: Can you remind us of what that comes to? Have you done specific calculations on that?

MR PARKER: I have and they are in Parker 3 at table 34.

The annual rates change up and down because the interest

1	rates change and also there are various assets whose
2	performance varies from year to year and I have just
3	used the actual performance of different asset classes
4	over time. So that is $\{IR-E/3/259\}$ . I do not think we
5	need to turn it up.

MR RIDYARD: Thanks. Dr Jenkins.

DR JENKINS: So I disagree that the right interest rate to use is this weighted average across the stock of wealth assets. I think that is not a good proxy for what will be a marginal decision.

Perhaps if we turn up {IR-E/18/230}, Figure 7.4. So that shows the weights that underpin Mr Parker's interest measure. So you can see that private pension assets, and I think this is showing the weight given to the age profile of the Class, so pension assets are a very large part of this. Then mortgage. Then net financial assets. So it is likely savings products and then financial debt, so that is going to be probably short-term loans.

I think I have explained that I think that it seems to me very unlikely that the Class Members will be adjusting their pension assets or their mortgage payments and there are many, many aspects of pensions and mortgages which are actually quite inflexible and so it is much more likely that for the level of costs that

we are seeing which I think that overcharge, even on the overcharge with Mr Duckworth's benchmark, the access element is I think in the early years like £50 a year and the total is £100 a year with the calls as well. To then say, someone would be changing -- making an overpayment on their mortgage if they did not have that or putting more money into their pension, those decisions are unlikely to be affected by that type of marginal change.

So that you would use an interest rate that is based on the shorter term assets and debt. I think even there you have to be a bit careful because if you use, say, a credit card rate, it would not seem to me normal to think that someone would take out -- would pay for it with a credit card and keep that credit card debt throughout the period. They would find a different way of financing it because that is expensive debt but I think these are -- what I have done is strip out pension assets and mortgage debt and reported what the interest rate would look like for the weights of only the more shorter term instruments in annex 6 of my second report.

MR RIDYARD: But to Mr Parker's earlier point, Dr Jenkins,
is a change in the sort of scheme to the consumers the
right way of looking at things because we are looking at

two parallel universes, are we not, the factual and the counterfactual? So there is not a situation where you get a nice or a nasty shock here. You are just going through life. It just so happens that in one of the scenarios the BT bill is a bit lower than in the other one.

DR JENKINS: Yes, possibly in that scenario you say you could use these averages. I think the challenge with that is, I mean, the pension asset weight is quite a lot going to be affected by the employer contributions and defined benefit pensions, so there are a lot of factors that are going on there. You are still using a stock measure rather than a flow of where people are putting their income and I mean, Mr Parker said that he was unable to find any other useful measure but there may be other ways to find out what the flow is of people's actual income choice at a given point in time. I am not sure that the stock of wealth is likely to be the best measure of that.

MR RIDYARD: Okay. Can you give us some idea then, if you discount the stocks and try and just focus on the marginal sort of either source of the funds or destinations of savings, how does that affect your view about what the appropriate interest rate is likely to be?

Τ	DR JENKINS: I think thank you those are the tables
2	that are on the screen now in annex 6 of my second
3	report where I show if you strip out mortgages and
4	pensions. So that is the adjustment I have made.
5	${IR-E/18/251-252}$ . Obviously if there were other
6	versions that could be done but that is the adjustment
7	I have made and it does make a reasonably important
8	difference to the amount of the alleged overcharge if
9	you adjust the interest rates in that way.
10	MR RIDYARD: Right.
11	MR PARKER: I suppose I would only say these are not
12	marginal. This is not based on evidence on what people
13	would have done with their marginal saving. It is
14	Dr Jenkins' view as to that people would not have
15	invested in their pensions or paid down their mortgage
16	but it is just the interest rate for those two for
17	the remaining two categories of their financial assets
18	and financial debt.
19	So the question of I am not sure it would be
20	right to think of it being based on evidence on how
21	people would have invested their money in the market in
22	response to a marginal change in their financial
23	position. Not that marginal actually.
24	MR RIDYARD: Mr Parker, do you think that your approach is
25	better in capturing the marginal choices?

1	MR PARKER: I think it is difficult to know but I have done
2	it based on the average of the outstanding stock because
3	I do not think that is necessarily capturing the
4	marginal changes but nor do I think taking out parts of
5	those options is necessarily capturing the marginal
6	changes either. I think it is I am not sure we have
7	anything better.
8	DR JENKINS: Yes, I think particularly as I said,
9	particularly for pensions which is the majority in
10	Mr Parker's approach for any Class Member who is
11	post-retirement age and has an annuity, even in that
12	counterfactual world their annuity is unlikely to be
13	materially different so there is very little change that
14	there is going to be to the drawdown on their mortgage.
15	So I think it makes more sense to use the shorter term
16	measures rather than these longer term measures for the
17	sorts of differences that we are looking at in this
18	case.
19	MR PARKER: Just a quick point on annuities. I was not

MR PARKER: Just a quick point on annuities. I was not really sure I understood the reference to annuities because once you bought an annuity then it would turn into income rather than wealth. You can actually see that in the figures on private pension assets that I report in tables 39 to 41 of my third report which show that the pension assets actually fall for the

1	age 65 plus group which is suggesting that for many of
2	those customers they are turning those assets into
3	either drawing it down or turning it into an annuity as
4	they see fit. So that is already taken into account.
5	MR RIDYARD: So a consumer with an annuity then would not -
6	obviously they are not able to renegotiate the annuity
7	so that would simply be a question of them changing
8	their rate of savings or
9	MR PARKER: It would change for that group. If you look at
10	table 39, ${IR-E/3/279}$ , for that group of the 65 plus
11	there is a considerable reduction in the assets. You
12	can see there are a lot more assets being put into
13	pension wealth in 55 to 64 compared to 45 to 54,
14	understandably, but then it falls down, and so that
15	effect is on average taken into account.
16	MR RIDYARD: Thank you. I do not think there is anything
17	else there on the list of questions on interest that we
18	have not adequately covered unless you think I have
19	missed something out in this discussion that is
20	important.
21	MR PARKER: I think that has all been covered.
22	THE CHAIRMAN: Because we picked up the interest bit in
23	question 24 when we were looking at those who died in
24	the earlier context.
25	MR RIDYARD: Yes, I do not know, was there anything

- 1 I think what was said about the deceased Class
- 2 Members -- effectively the answer before I think was
- about interest rates rather than anything else, was it
- 4 not?
- 5 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
- 6 MR PARKER: Yes.
- 7 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Then that concludes the hot tub
- 8 session.
- 9 MR BEARD: I do not know if Mr Spitz has any clarification.
- 10 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, I did not ask about that.
- 11 MR SPITZ: No, I do not.
- 12 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you, Mr Beard.
- MR BEARD: I had a quick couple.
- 14 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
- 15 Questions by MR BEARD
- MR BEARD: One is just a transcript point. Could we just go
- back to page 67, line I think it is 18. It will pop up
- on the screen. It was just line 18. It said "very
- 19 little change" -- this is Dr Jenkins -- "there was going
- to be drawdown on their mortgage", but you were
- 21 referring to annuities. Did you mean mortgage or
- 22 pension?
- DR JENKINS: Pension, yes.
- 24 MR BEARD: I was just double checking.
- 25 Earlier on you referred to a table about 0 to 4s,

1	4-9s and so on. This was to do with the categorisation
2	of the SMEs. It may be worth just going to because you
3	did not have the reference in front of you but I think
4	it is $\{C/357/9\}$ . Was this the one you were thinking of?
5	DR JENKINS: Yes, if you Figure 1, the SME size. You can
6	see that it was not the case that this survey
7	particularly or predominantly was on the micro, the
8	micro group and they did ensure that they had a good
9	representation of single self-employed businesses which
10	they would normally just do on a 1-4 basis but you can
11	see that that distribution across the different sizes of
12	small to medium sized enterprises which is below 259
13	employees.

Then all the results in the tables are then weighted. So where they have over sampled a particular category then they will re-weight the answers that are given such that you get an answer that is actually representative of SMEs in the economy but they overweight when they are sampling to ensure they have enough respondents to be able to draw meaningful conclusions from the answers that they give.

MR BEARD: Sorry, I offered it ... Okay, Mr Parker, for the purpose of the transcript, has just held his hands up on this one. Not in a concession kind of way.

MR PARKER: Nothing to add.

1 MR BEARD: Nothing to add, thank you. 2 I do not have anything else. The only issue is that obviously there is a question about perspectives on 3 compound and simple. I do not know whether the 4 5 Tribunal, although it has not specifically dealt with methodologies for ascertaining simple interest rates, 6 7 wants to explore that in any way, but I assume not, given the questions that have been asked? 8 MR RIDYARD: I do not have anything on that, certainly. 9 THE CHAIRMAN: No, I do not think so. 10 MR BEARD: That is fine. 11 12 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 13 Right, let us break for lunch now. Is Mr Duckworth -- will he be here by 10 to? 14 15 MR SPITZ: Yes, I think so. Can I just raise one housekeeping point. 16 MR BEARD: 17 Obviously we have cross-examination of these witnesses. 18 I do not think I am going to necessarily be very long 19 with Mr Parker, but I would be grateful if we could 20 still keep it in tomorrow morning, rather than following on straight after Mr Duckworth, if that is not of 21 22 inconvenience to the Tribunal? THE CHAIRMAN: Not especially, provided -- well, speaking 23 24 for myself, provided that we are not likely to need more 25 than the day that we have got for cross-examination.

- MR BEARD: No, no, no. I am looking at the half an hour to
  an hour territory.

  THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Spitz?
- 4 MR SPITZ: That is fine for me too. In fact I think it is 5 preferable.
- 6 THE CHAIRMAN: That sounds all right, but we will discuss it
  7 over lunch.
- 8 MR BEARD: I am grateful. Thanks very much.
- 9 THE CHAIRMAN: 1.50, please.
- 10 (12.59 pm)
- 11 (Luncheon Adjournment)
- 12 (1.50 pm)
- THE CHAIRMAN: Before Mr Duckworth is re-sworn or reaffirmed
  and then asked the questions, we wanted to address
  briefly the letter from Simmons & Simmons which was sent
  yesterday in relation to the short further questions
  which the Tribunal wished Mr Duckworth to address. The
  content of that letter can be read into the transcript
  in due course.
- We are of course aware that the Class Representative
  has the burden of proof in this case. However,
  especially in a case involving expert evidence as
  substantial, complex and lengthy as that in this case,
  we consider that there can be nothing inappropriate in
  the Tribunal either wishing to follow up a matter

Τ	canvassed originally in an earlier not cub session, or
2	in putting to an expert a point which the Tribunal now
3	considers needs to be addressed which was not dealt with
4	previously. This is in circumstances where the further
5	questions are of very limited ambit and can be dealt
6	with shortly and, of course, in circumstances where BT
7	will be given the full opportunity to make its own
8	contribution to the discussion if it wishes.
9	The alternative would be for these points to be left
10	hanging in the air, which would cause difficulties for
11	the Tribunal when it comes to its deliberations. None
12	of this affects the burden of proof in any way.
13	MR BEARD: Very grateful, thank you.
14	THE CHAIRMAN: Right, let us have Mr Duckworth re-sworn or
15	reaffirmed.
16	MR MARTIN DUCKWORTH (reaffirmed)
17	THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Mr Ridyard will deal with the
18	questions.
19	Questions by THE TRIBUNAL
20	MR RIDYARD: Mr Duckworth, good afternoon. So you will have
21	seen our questions which we can deal with quite swiftly.
22	The first two really relate to the 2009 RFS exercise,
23	and we just wanted to be sure that we had understood
24	properly what information the RFS contains about the
25	split between common costs and incremental costs.

- 1 So are we right in thinking that the RFS documents
- do not tell us about the relative sizes of incremental
- 3 costs versus common costs?
- 4 A. Yes, that is right.
- 5 MR RIDYARD: Is there nothing within this sort of supporting
- 6 documents that could help us to unravel that or get some
- 7 better clues on that question?
- 8 A. On the relative magnitude of those two elements?
- 9 MR RIDYARD: Yes, yes.
- 10 A. There is nothing in the documentation that provides sort
- of quantities of incremental and common costs. There
- is, within the detailed attribution methods, sort of
- qualitative information on how incremental and common
- 14 costs have been separated and the approach to the
- 15 attribution of incremental costs and the fixed and
- 16 common costs, but nothing that says the relative sizes
- of those costs which is in the public domain.
- 18 MR RIDYARD: Okay, and I mean that sort of seems a little
- 19 bit surprising, given that they must -- I am sorry, I am
- 20 not doubting your word, obviously, but it just seems
- 21 surprising given that they must have had -- they have
- 22 taken a cost causality approach to the incremental
- 23 costs, and then they have had to make some other
- 24 assumption or use some other convention for the common
- 25 costs, but it is still -- even from that you cannot

- tell, from the fact that they have done something
- 2 different to the two types of costs, what the magnitudes
- 3 are?
- 4 A. So the BT RFS were produced under obligations, and then
- 5 some of those obligations refer to publication of the
- 6 high level separated accounts, and also a transparency
- 7 obligation which set out how those accounts were
- 8 constructed. But the detail of the underlying numbers,
- 9 which were the input or -- the inputs to construction of
- 10 the RFS, were considered I think confidential by BT and
- so were not put in the public domain.
- 12 MR RIDYARD: Okay. Thank you.
- 13 THE CHAIRMAN: Could I -- sorry, could I just come in, there
- 14 was a specific question about the document on
- 15 question 2, which perhaps I can take, because it was
- 16 something that occurred to us when we were looking.
- 17 If you look at question 2 -- we do not need to turn
- it up, but we looked at the underlying documents that
- 19 you used when setting out all of the costs lines for the
- 20 purpose of your exercise. You took two out, I think,
- 21 because you had already dealt with them in direct costs.
- 22 Is that it in terms of the underlying documents?
- 23 A. In terms of the ...
- 24 THE CHAIRMAN: That you used for the purpose of --
- 25 A. Yes. So the reference to Annex 5(b), and I can cover

L	that off quite quickly, that was the Ofcom labelling of
2	tables. So when Ofcom set out the obligations for
3	regulatory financial statements. They said you need to
1	produce these annexes. When BT published them, they
5	published them in a different order, and so section 9.1
ó	is equivalent to Annex 5(b) in Ofcom's kind of pro forma
7	for the RFS.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: It is not as if there is some other document 9 called Annex 5(b)?

10 A. No.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: That was the clarification I wanted. Thank
12 you.

MR RIDYARD: So the next question is our question 3, and that was when we were thinking about the notion of incremental costs. Now, when you are looking at the 2009 RFS, you rightly say that in 2009 all of the voice customers were SFV customers in the sense that BT was not allowed to bundle at that period.

But then it seemed to us that what you were saying from that was that therefore we can use voice as the increment that we are considering when we are considering SFV. But it occurred to us that the increment we are interested in with regard to SFV was potentially different from the voice increment, because obviously the SFV increment does not encompass all voice

customers during the claim period and, therefore, what is incremental to SFV might exclude things which are to do with voice, you know, for example, if there were fixed costs of setting up the voice service, BT would have to incur those whether or not it is the SFV customers, because it would still be providing a voice service to all of the bundle customers.

We wanted to get your comments on whether this difference in the way of thinking about the increments between 2009 and the claim period was material to the analysis that we needed to undertake?

A. So you are correct that there are potentially some costs which are fixed costs necessary to deliver voice services and those fixed costs should have been attributed to the retail voice services in the RFS, but because they are fixed costs they are not causally related to any single line, and so would have been attributed across voice services in a way such as based on the number of lines, which kind of spreads the cost across all -- for its customers there.

When you move to a world where SFV is a subset of voice customers, that does not really change. You still have a fixed, cost which is now fixed in common if you look at SFV as an increment and dual play as another increment, but you still need to recover those costs,

1	those fixed costs, which are now common across
2	effectively two increments, across those two increments,
3	and the appropriate way to do that is probably still to
4	use the same cost driver, so number of lines to spread
5	that across the SFV increment and within the SFV
6	increment, and also to the dual play customers who are
7	also taking voice.
8	So from a LRIC+ perspective, it should not change

the sort of the unit cost just because you are separating out SFV customers from dual play customers.

MR RIDYARD: Right. From a LRIC+ perspective I can see
that, because you still have to allocate the costs and
so you do it as best you can. But from a LRIC
perspective, in other words, if you are just looking at
the incremental costs, then it would make a difference,
would it not?

A. Yes.

MR RIDYARD: So what this could be doing, it could be --even if we had an answer to the first questions, ie we knew what the split was between incremental costs and common costs in the 2009 RFS, we would then need to revisit that information, which we do not have of course, but we would need to revisit that in the light of the SFV increment as opposed to the voice increment, because there could well be things which were

- incremental to voice but not incremental to SFV?
- 2 A. Yes, that is right.
- 3 MR RIDYARD: So your position on that, I guess, given that
- 4 you are not -- so this only matters if we care about the
- 5 split between incremental costs and common costs, but
- 6 under LRIC+ you are saying that because you have to
- 7 allocate them all, it sort of -- it still matters, but
- 8 it all gets swept up sooner or later?
- 9 A. Yes.
- 10 MR RIDYARD: But it does create a material, or potentially
- 11 material difference. Again, is there any way of us to
- get a handle on what the materiality of that difference
- is between the incremental costs and the common costs
- 14 when we are looking at these two different questions?
- 15 A. Again, there is no source which I consider robust to
- 16 attribute costs at that level where you can, for
- 17 example, identify some fixed and common costs to the
- 18 provision of voice services.
- 19 MR RIDYARD: Okay. Yes, all right, okay, I think that is
- 20 perhaps as far as we can take that. Thanks.
- 21 Then the last set of questions that we had was about
- 22 costs that would be in, I suppose, indirect costs in
- your sort of scheme of thinking about the costs, in
- other words, the payments that are made to Openreach.
- 25 We did have a few exchanges with you about this right at

the beginning of the first hot tub and when we came back to it I think a day or two later as well, but we just wanted to explore that a little bit further with you.

The point which was of interest to us was whether, even though these payments that are made by the retail operators to Openreach are direct costs, in the sense that they are per customer costs, there could still be some element of commonality there as between voice and broadband, depending on how the retail operator chose to buy the services from Openreach, and the way we understood it from your evidence in the hot tub was that -- your evidence and Dr Jenkins' evidence was that BT chose to buy two separate services from Openreach, one for voice, one for broadband, but some of the other operators chose to buy a single Openreach product which covered voice and broadband, albeit that that meant that they might then have to incur other costs to put the service together.

What we were wondering was whether, for situations where the retail operator chose to buy both the voice and broadband from Openreach in a single contract, could there be an element of commonality there that might be relevant to the analysis of thinking about which are common costs and which are incremental costs?

A. The NPS service, which rivals to BT bought from

- Openreach, allows provision of both voice and broadband services over that line.
- 3 MR RIDYARD: Yes.
- A. If an operator wanted to provide an SFV service they
  have a choice of buying that NPS service or a WLR
  service, and in Ofcom's 2017 statement, and the evidence
  of that which I can turn up if helpful, Ofcom says that
  generally rivals purchase or do not use LLU, i.e. MPF,
  for provision of SFV services.
- 10 MR RIDYARD: Okay.
- But some also do, so it is quite confusing. But the 11 12 issue is when we are thinking about common costs they 13 are not fixed, and common costs, it is a question of if you want to serve a customer with a dual play service, 14 15 you purchase MPF. There is effectively an economy of 16 scope in delivering both voice and broadband over that 17 MPF service from Openreach, but there is not a common cost then to providing an SFV service to another 18 19 customer because --
- 20 MR RIDYARD: No, but for some aspects of the case we are
  21 interested in the situation at the customer level. For
  22 example, when we are looking at this question about the
  23 incentive to bundle, we are -- after all, in the extreme
  24 scenario, if there is a retailer that costs me the same
  25 to provide the voice service as the bundle service, then

it costs me nothing more to upgrade your service from

voice to bundle. Therefore, even if I got a penny more

out of you as a customer, I would be happy and

unambiguously better off.

So we are interested in the economies of scope for the customer level for these questions, are we not?

- A. Yes, and I think that is a good characterisation of the position where, for rivals using MPF, the incremental cost of providing broadband on top of a voice service was relatively low, and to the degree that they could set the incremental price for broadband above the incremental costs then they had a very strong incentive to deliver bundles if they could.
- I think it is helpful to look at the evidence that

  Ofcom looked at here.
- 16 MR RIDYARD: Yes.

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17 If we turn up, I think it is  $\{OR-C/4/24\}$ . This is Α. 18 showing -- the figure shows BT's wholesale line rental 19 and MPF prices, and in the latter part of the period 20 actually MTP is more expensive than WLR, and in order to 21 provide a voice service on MPF then you need to add some 22 active equipment on top of the MPF service, whereas the 23 WLR service includes the active equipment which is provided by Openreach. So just to provide a voice 24 service, it is likely that WLR would be the cheaper way 25

- 1 to provide that.
- 2 If we go down to the bottom of the page, and there
- 3 is a footnote. It says:
- 4 "We are also aware that generally CPs that have
- their own network may still rely on BT's copper network
- to provide voice [services] not many CPs use their own
- 7 LLU network to provide voice-only services."
- 8 So that is ...
- 9 MR RIDYARD: So the reference to "CPs that have their own
- 10 network", does that mean Virgin, or are they talking
- 11 about some other aspect?
- 12 A. So that would include Virgin, but I think they are also
- 13 referring to the CPs, competitive providers, or rivals
- 14 to BT, not many of them use their own LLU, local loop
- unbundling network, so they need to put in place some
- equipment and create their own network on top of the
- 17 copper lines that they buy from Openreach.
- 18 So when providing SFV services, not all rivals use
- 19 MPF, but when providing voice and broadband then they
- will use MPF, so there will be presumably an incremental
- 21 cost to using MPF, you know, even the direct costs, the
- 22 MPF costs, it is slightly higher than the wholesale line
- 23 rental cost, and you need to include the equipment on
- top of that.
- 25 So it is not, as you sort of characterised it,

- 1 a zero cost to provide broadband on top of the voice
- 2 service. There is some incremental cost in providing
- 3 voice plus broadband over MPF compared to providing
- 4 Voice Only over wholesale line rental.
- 5 MR RIDYARD: Yes, I was setting that up as an extreme case,
- just to see the final question. But there is -- I think
- 7 you said you think there is still an economy of scope in
- 8 providing both services in a bundled fashion?
- 9 A. Yes, compared to -- particularly compared to the
- 10 alternative of buying wholesale line rental from
- 11 Openreach, and then providing a separate broadband
- service to wholesale line rental in the way that
- 13 BT Consumer does.
- 14 MR RIDYARD: So with respect to the BT's bundle customers,
- is that saying that BT did not supply bundle customers
- in the most efficient manner, or am I missing something
- 17 there?
- 18 A. So the rivals chose to generally use MPF, so TalkTalk
- and Sky generally used MPF to deliver bundles of
- 20 service. BT Consumer did not. I cannot really
- 21 speculate on why rivals took one choice and BT Consumer
- took another choice of services.
- 23 MR RIDYARD: Yes. It would be quite interesting to
- 24 understand that, I think, because I am not sure --
- 25 obviously I cannot press you for evidence on something

- that you have not necessarily considered. Okay.
- 2 Then when we move -- just to complete or to continue
- 3 the sort of technological story, but when we move on to
- 4 the superfast broadband, then we are talking about VULA,
- 5 I think, are we not?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 MR RIDYARD: Does that create fewer economies of scope
- 8 between voice and broadband?
- 9 A. Yes, because at a network level then the rivals needed
- 10 to provide -- or the rivals needed to buy two services
- 11 to provide voice and broadband. They needed to buy
- 12 typically wholesale line rental to provide the voice
- service, and then the VULA product, GEA, to provide the
- 14 broadband service.
- MR RIDYARD: So that pushed the rivals towards the way BT
- 16 was doing things. I know the technology had moved on,
- 17 but in terms of the structure of how it was done,
- towards the BT sort of model, as it were?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 20 MR RIDYARD: Then when they move on to the next sort of, as
- I understand it, sort of generation of the technology,
- 22 the VOIP technology which is currently being used,
- I mean, that puts everything down the broadband route,
- as I understand it; is that correct?
- 25 A. Yes, that is correct, and the main driver behind that is

1 wholesale line rental relies on legacy equipment in 2 local exchanges, which BT wants to retire by 2025, and so, yes, which is to remove all this 20th Century 3 4 equipment which has been running for the last quarter of 5 a century. It is increasingly obsolete and difficult to maintain. Just move to a single IP-based network. 6 7 MR RIDYARD: Yes. But instead of that actually -- or where that happens, does that mean that we do have a single 8 wholesale price to cover both, effectively both voice 9 and broadband? 10 11 Yes. Α. 12 MR RIDYARD: So we are close to -- we are then increasing 13 the economies of scope between the two services? A. Yes. I am not sure of the detail, but I think Openreach 14 15 may provide a Voice Only service at a lower cost than 16 the service which provides broadband and voice. 17 MR RIDYARD: Okay. But nevertheless, if -- yes, so that 18 does suggest the scope of economies could be that much 19 greater in this model. 20 Maybe this is not something that you looked into, 21 but do we have the figures anywhere for the importance 22 of VOIP as distinct from the older technologies in terms 23 of customers reached?

I am not aware of that being in the evidence.

25 MR RIDYARD: No, okay.

Α.

24

- 1 THE CHAIRMAN: Could I, if we have finished with those
- 2 questions, could I just go back, I just want to make
- 3 sure I have clear your answer to question 3 which
- 4 Mr Ridyard asked you about.
- I think the result of your answer is: it is not as
- if there were any indirect costs which were loaded too
- 7 much on SFV services, or not enough on SFV services, as
- 8 a result of your analysis, in the context of question 3
- 9 that you were discussing earlier on?
- 10 A. Yes, if we are looking at costs which are fixed to
- 11 provide voice services, then the change to some voice
- 12 customers being SFV, whereas others being dual play, in
- my opinion does not change the LRIC+ estimate of costs.
- 14 THE CHAIRMAN: Because you just divide it up by the number
- of lines.
- 16 A. Exactly, or some similar attribution methodology.
- 17 THE CHAIRMAN: Or some similar thing. That is true for what
- 18 would be regarded as the incremental costs as well,
- 19 presumably?
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 THE CHAIRMAN: I do not know if Mr Ridyard had anything
- 22 more?
- 23 MR RIDYARD: No, I think that has covered all of our
- 24 queries. Thank you very much, Mr Duckworth.
- 25 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

Ι	Now, first of all, Ms Kreisberger, do you have any
2	clarificatory questions?
3	MS KREISBERGER: I do not, no, sir.
4	THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Beard, do you have any clarificatory
5	questions or cross-examination questions?
6	MR BEARD: No, I do not have cross-examination or
7	clarificatory questions, thank you.
8	THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.
9	Mr Duckworth, we are very grateful for you coming
10	back in. That is your evidence on this completed.
11	Thank you.
12	(The witness withdrew)
13	THE CHAIRMAN: Right, so that is it for today.
14	MR BEARD: If that is okay with the Tribunal, yes, and as
15	I say, I do not think I am going to be long, and it
L 6	turns out Mr Spitz is not going to be long, so I think
L7	we will be done by lunchtime tomorrow.
L8	THE CHAIRMAN: Right.
L 9	Anything you want to add, Ms Kreisberger?
20	MS KREISBERGER: No.
21	THE CHAIRMAN: We are in the course of preparing a list of
22	points which we would like the closing submissions to
23	deal with. They are probably points which will be on
24	the issues agenda in any event but just things which
25	have occurred to us we would like to have covered off or

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             provided to us, and we will probably get that to you on
 2
             Wednesday.
 3
         MR BEARD: Great.
         MS KREISBERGER: We would be very grateful for that. Sir,
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 5
             will you be giving any further directions on written
 6
             closings?
 7
         THE CHAIRMAN: Not unless we are asked to.
 8
         MS KREISBERGER: We are not going to be asking for any
 9
             specific directions on closings.
10
         THE CHAIRMAN: We have the dates when they are to be in and
             we know what the issues are.
11
12
         MS KREISBERGER: We are very grateful.
         THE CHAIRMAN: That is where we will rest, subject to these
13
14
             further questions.
15
         MS KREISBERGER: No, that is understood.
16
         THE CHAIRMAN: All right, 10.30 tomorrow then, please.
17
         (2.23 pm)
         (The hearing adjourned until Tuesday, 5 March at 10.30 am)
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